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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BELLMORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BELLMORE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL, 
Charging Party,, 
COOPER and ENGLANDER (WILLIAM 
Ho ENGLANDER, ESQ„, of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
ROBERT SAPERSTEIN, ESQ,, for 
Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Bellmare 
Administrative Council (Council) to a hearing officer's decision 
dismissing that part of its charge which alleged that the Bellmare 
Union Free School District (District) violated §209-a„l(a), (b) 
and (d) of the Taylor Law by unilaterally imposing a requirement 
that the principals represented by the Council attend evening 
parent-teacher conferences - conferences which had always been 
held in the daytime during normal school hours„ ' 
The facts, as set forth in the hearing officer's decision, 
show that the principals have always attended, without extra 
remuneration, evening functions at which teaching staff is present 
On these facts, the hearing officer found that the Council failed 
to establish that the District changed any practice,, Treating 
specifically with the central claim of the Council, i.e„, that 
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attendance at evening parent-teacher conferences increased the 
hours of work of the principals, the hearing officer found that 
the principals' hours had always been flexible, depending on the 
number of evening activities scheduled during the year. 
On the basis of his findings, the hearing officer concluded 
that the District did not refuse to negotiate in good faith in 
violation of §209-a.1(d). He also concluded that the record 
contained no evidence that the District's action was taken for 
the improper purposes to which §209-a.l(a) and (b) are directed. 
In its exceptions, the Council argues that the facts show 
that the District increased the hours of work of the principals 
without first negotiating, thereby violating §209-a.l(d). The 
Council further argues that because the District negotiated the 
subject and reached an agreement with the teachers' union 
before instituting evening parent-teacher conference hours, but 
did not do so with it, the District "belittled this bargaining 
unit by ignoring its duty to negotiate while at the same time 
acknowledging its duty to negotiate with the teachers1 union." 
The Council urges that this constitutes a violation of §209-a.l(a) 
and (b). 
We sustain the decision of the hearing officer. As the record 
shows, and the hearing officer found, the existing term and 
condition of employment for principals with respect to hours of 
work was that their hours were flexible, varying from year to 
year, depending on the number of evening activities.. Therefore, 
the District did not, by requiring the principals to attend the 
evening parent-teacher conferences, change this term and condition 
of employment. 
oo<p/ 
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With respect to the Council's claim that the District 
violated §209-ao1(a) and (b) , the only record evidence is that 
the District did negotiate and include the subject in an agreement 
with the teachers' union covering the period July 1, 1979 through 
June 30, 1982, but did not negotiate the subject with the Council, 
with which it had an agreement in effect in November 1979, when 
1/ 
it actedo These bare facts cannot support a finding that the 
District acted for the purpose of interfering with rights 
y 
protected by §209-a„l(a) of the Act„ 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in all respects„ 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 29, 1980 
1/ The record does not show the expiration date of the agreement 
but does show that negotiations for a successor agreement 
were not scheduled to commence until May 22, 1980„ 
2/ The conduct described is not of the type that could violate 
§209-a.l(b) of the Act„ Board of Education, City School 
District of Albany, 6 PERB If3012.' 
Harold Ro Newman, Chairman 
David C0 Randies, Member 
mm 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4493 
JOHN F. BOGART (WALLACE L. FLACK ,-Esq. and 
MICHAEL BOYCE, Esq.",r:o.£ Counsel:) ;" -•for-;;R'espjDndent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (MARJORIE KAROWE, 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Nassau 
Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge. The charge 
alleged that the Town of Oyster Bay (Town) violated subdivisions 
(a), (b), (c) and (d) of §209-a.l of the Taylor Law in that it 
withdrew benefits that had been enjoyed by Pasquale D'Alessio 
"as a direct result of D'Alessio's activities on behalf of CSEA." 
D'Alessio, who is president of CSEA, had been assigned a Town-
owned vehicle on a 24-hour-a-day basis. He had also been excused 
from regular assignments so that he could devote his full atten-
tion to the administration of the agreement between the Town and 
CSEA. These benefits of D'Alessio were withdrawn two days after 
an election in which the incumbent Town Supervisor was returned tc 
office, but in which D'Alessio had supported the challenger. 
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TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
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The hearing officer determined that the facts alleged in 
the charge could not establish a violation of subdivisions (a), 
(b) or (c) of §209-a.l of the Taylor Law. She noted that an 
element of each of these violations is that the action complained 
of must relate to activities of D'Alessio that are -orotected by 
• 1 * ' 
the Taylor Law, but that the withdfawal'io:.B.'bren'ef Irs'• from. him'"were 
2 
merely related to his political activities. 
The hearing officer also dismissed so much of the charge 
3 
as alleges a violation of §209-a.l(d). The basis for this part 
of her decision is that the collectively negotiated agreement 
1 The statute provides: 
"209-a.l. Improper employer practices. It shall be an 
improper practice for a public employer or its agents , 
deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce 
public employees in the exercise of their rights 
guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose 
of depriving them of such rights; (b) to dominate or 
interfere with the formation or administration of any 
employee organization for the purpose of depriving them . 
of such rights; (c) to discriminate against any employee 
for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging member-
ship in, or participation in the activities ofy any 
employee organization;..7T (emphasis supplied) 
2. See Town of Lake Luzerne, ll'PEKB 1[3094 (1978) and Lawrence 
N. Van Pelt, I PERB 11399.91 (1968). 
3. CSL §209-a.l.(d) provides: 
"to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representatives of its public 
employees." 
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between the Town and CSEA directly , addresses the right of D'Alessio 
as president of CSEA, to be relieved of all regular duties without 
any loss of benefits.— The hearing officer interpreted this part 
of the charge as a demand that the collectively negotiated agree-
ment be enforced, and she. ruled that this Board cannot do so,— 
We affirm the hearing officer's decision to the extent that 
she ruled that this Board cannot preclude the reassignment of 
duties to D'Alessio because it would require us to enforce •• 
the parties' agreement. CSEA contends, however, that the hearing 
officer did not deal with a part of its charge. Indeed, she did 
not deal with the allegation that the Town violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith' iin:.-..l that it withdrew D'Alessio's use of 
a Town vehicle on a 24-hour basis. 
The record shows that D'Alessio was first given the use of a 
Town vehicle on a 24-hour basis in 1973 when he became a Super-
visor I in the Highway Department. He was permitted to use the 
vehicle for job-connected travel, including commuting to and from 
work. During the evening, he was permitted to use the vehicle 
only if called to work by the Town because of some job-related 
emergency. During the regular workday, he was also permitted 
to use the vehicle in connection with his administration 
— Article 3-1.8 of the contract provides, in pertinent part: 
"The President of the Town of Oyster Bay Unit of the 
Civil Service Employee's Association shall be permitted 
to perform his duties on a full-time basis without loss 
in pay or other benefits." 
- See CSL §205.5(d) which provides: 
"... the board shall not have authority to enforce an agree-
ment between an employer and an employee organization and 
shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation 
of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an 
improper employer or employee organization practice. ..." 
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of the collectively negotiated agreement on behalf of CSEA. The 
Town vehicle continued to be made available to him when, in 1978, 
he was promoted to a position of Supervisor II and was assigned 
to the Department of Parks. When D'Alessio's right to devote his 
full time to administration.of the collectively negotiated agree-
ment on behalf of CSEA was withdrawn, he was also told that he 
could no longer take the Town vehicle home. Instead, he was per-
mitted to use a Town vehicle during work hours only, and was 
required to provide his own transportation to and from work. He 
was also told that he could not use the Town vehicle when travel-
ing in connection with the administration of the collectively 
negotiated agreement. There is uncontested evidence that this 
loss of a Town vehicle required D'Alessio to spend $15.00 a week 
more than he had been spending. 
In defense of its action, the Town introduced evidence 
showing that only 5 of 8 Supervisors II in the Department of 
Parks are permitted to take Town vehicles home. They further 
introduced evidence that, over a period of time, the Town reviews 
the granting of this benefit to particular Supervisors II. Thus, 
according to the Town, its past practice does not establish a 
basis for any expectation that D'Alessio had a continuing right to 
use the Town vehicle for commuting to and from work. 
The Town did review the assignment of Town vehicles to 
Supervisors II in the Department of Parks from time to time and 
vehicles were reassigned based upon Town needs. A major factor 
in the reassignment of Town vehicles has been the likelihood of 
a particular Supervisor being called in for emergency work during 
evening hours and the need for some Town vehicles to be kept 
Board - U-4493 -5 
available at central locations for emergency work. The record 
indicates, however, that the withdrawal of D'Alessio's vehicle 
was not related to any application of this past practice. The 
Town's attempt to justify withdrawal of the vehicle from D'Alessio 
on the-basis of its standards would appear to be pretextual. The 
vehicle taken from D'Alessio was not reassigned to another Super-
visor. Rather, it was left at a central location where two other 
Town vehicles were already available. The Town attempts to explain 
its need for this particular vehicle on the basis of its having a 
special radio. According to the Town, that radio, which was put 
in the vehicle for D'Alessio's convenience in connection with his 
contract adminstration work, made it particularly useful for 
assignment in the event of snow emergencies. However, when asked 
whether the withdrawal of the vehicle from D'Alessio on November 8 
was related to the Town's snow removal needs, D'Alessio's super-
6 
visor gave an evasive answer.— 
On the basis of our reading of the record, we find that the 
Town withdrew D'Alessio's use of the Town vehicle for commuting 
to and from work for reasons not related to its past practice 
of granting and withdrawing such a benefit to other Supervisors 
II in the Department of Parks. The benefit of having a Town 
vehicle to. commute to and from work is a term and condition of 
— The record shows, at page 37: 
"Q, But you took away the truck in November, ... Is 
that the snow season? 
A, I have no idea what date it was taken away. I 
know it was taken away.. 
Q. But you say you ordered it? 
A. But I have no idea what the date was." 
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employment and a mandatory subject of negotiation.— The Town's 
unilateral alteration of the standards inherent in its past prac-
tice, and its action pursuant to its new, undisclosed, standard, 
is a violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith. Accord-
ingly, 
WE ORDER the Town of Oyster Bay: 
1. To restore a Town-owned vehicle to D'Alessio for com-
muting to and from work; 
2. To cease and desist from denying a Town-owned vehicle 
to D'Alessio for commuting to and from work for reasons 
not related to its past practice of granting and with-
drawing such a benefit to other Supervisors II in the 
Department of Parks; 
3. To reimburse D'Alessio $15.00 a week for each week in 
which he was denied the use of a Town-owned vehicle 
to commute to and from work; and 
4. To post conspicuously a notice in the form attached, 
at locations normally used for communication with its 
employees. 
Dated, Albany, New York 
December 29, 1980 
Harold, R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies /Member 
7 See County, of Onondaga, 12 PERB '13035 (1979), aff'd Town of 
Onondaga v. PERB, 77 AD2d 783 (4th Dept., 1980),. 13 PERB 117011. 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: t h e Town o f O y s t e r B a y : 
1. Will, r e s to re a Town-owned vehicle to Pasquale 
D'Alessio to-be used by him in commuting to 
and from h i s home to his place of employment;-
2. Will not deny a Town-owned vehicle to D'Alessio 
for commuting to and from work for reasons.not 
•related to i t s past pract ice of granting and 
withdrawing such a benefit to other Supervisors 
IT in the Department of Parks; 
3. Will reimburse Pasquale D'Alessio for expenses 
incurred in commuting to and from his home and 
his place of employment at the r a t e ,of $15.00 a 
week ($3.00 per day) for each work week or par t 
thereof, during which he was denied the use of 
a Town-owned vehicle for th i s purpose. 
Town of.Oyster.Bay. . 
Employer 
Dated By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STAIE.;:_OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HARPURSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
HARPURSVILLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD;'DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4654 
BALL & MCDONOUGH, P.C. (KEVIN F. 
MCDONOUGH, ESQ., of counsel), for 
Respondent 
WILLIAM FINGER, for Charging 
Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Harpursville 
Central School District (District) and the cross-exceptions of 
the Harpursville Teachers Association (Association) to a decision 
of a hearing officer which found that the District had violated 
its duty to bargain in good faith, but imposed no remedy. 
FACTS 
On April 11, 1980, the Association filed a charge against 
the District alleging a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Civil 
Service Law (CSL). The charge contained many specifications, 
including the claim that two members of the school board, who 
were part of the District's negotiating team, failed to recommend 
approval or to vote in favor or an agreement concerning a retire-
ment incentive plan. 
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top of it, the chief negotiator for the District had hand-written 
"separate from tentative agreement". The District's negotiator 
had also hand-written above his signature the statement, "This 
renewal will be recommended to the Harpursville Board of Educa-
tion by the administration." Attached to the memorandum was a 
letter of recommendation from the district superintendent urging 
renewal of the plan. 
The Association approved both documents on February 7, 1980. 
The school board approved the main contract on that day, but 
delayed action on the retirement incentive plan. On March 18, 
1980, the parties signed a final contract for the period July 1, 
1979 to July 1, 1982, which included the provisions of the 
"tentative agreement" but did not include the provisions of the 
retirement incentive plan. On March 27, the school board con-
sidered the retirement incentive plan, voting six to one against 
its acceptance. Both the members who served on the District's 
negotiating team voted against the proposal. 
The hearing officer concluded that the failure of the two 
school board members to vote for the Memorandum of Understanding, 
at what he called a ratification vote, violated the District's 
duty to negotiate in good faith. However, he determined that the 
only remedy would have been to order execution of the contract, 
and since it had already been executed by the Superintendent of 
the District, no order directing its execution was necessary. He 
further concluded that the Memorandum constituted a "binding 
contract" unless legislative approval pursuant to CSL §201.12 was 
Board - U-4654 -5 
text, the duty to negotiate in good faith merely forbids negoti-
ators to mislead the other party. It does not prevent negotiators 
from filing a dissenting report regarding an agreement, or a part 
of an agreement, which they oppose so long as the other party is 
not misled. Here, we cannot find that the school board members 
of the negotiating team misled the Association. 
In any event, the hearing officer's decision is based upon 
the hypothesis that the action by the school board members of the 
negotiating team constituted executive rather than legislative 
2 
action.— He stated that the school board members of the negoti-
ating team would be obligated to support an agreement only in a 
ratification vote, but not in a vote on legislative approval. But 
the record is not clear as to whether the submission of the Memo-
randum of Understanding to the school board was for the purpose 
of ratification or for the purpose of legislative approval. We 
do not conclude that it was a ratification vote.— As the record 
does not establish that the school board membeis of the negoti-
ating team misled the Association or that the conduct of those 
members complained about constituted executive, rather than legis-
— See Board of Trustees of the Ulster County Community College 
and the Ulster County; Legislature, 4 PERB 1[3088 (1971). 
— Even if there were a ratification vote and the board members' 
conduct were, therefore, improper, we could not direct the 
District to implement the Memorandum of Understanding. Sec-
tion 201.12 governs the approval of the Memorandum and, as 
the hearing officer stated, the matter lies outside our 
jurisdiction. 
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The parties entered negotiations for a successor agreement to. 
one expiring in June 1979. The initial proposal presented by the 
Association consisted of modifications of the then current 
agreement (hereinafter, main contract) including continuation of 
a retirement incentive plan which had been negotiated in midterm 
of the main contract. The record discloses that the District made 
clear that the continuation of the retirement incentive plan 
would have to be considered as a separate matter to be embodied 
in a separate document, and that most of the negotiating sessions 
dealt with the modification of the main contract. The Association 
was advised of .-.-the., concern of the: District' s negotiating team that; inclusion : 
of. the/ retirement incentive, plan' in the same, -document.- as the 
modification of the main contract would jeopardize its acceptance 
by the school board, and it agreed to the separation. The record 
also discloses that the members of the school board who were part 
of the District's negotiating team did not participate in any 
negotiations concerning the retirement incentive plan. 
On February 5, 1980, the chief negotiators for the parties 
signed two documents. The main contract was labeled a "tentative 
agreement" for 1979-82 containing the legend: "subject to the 
approval by the Association and the Board.of Education". The 
record does not indicate whether the "approval" of the District 
was a ratification or the statutory approval required by §§201.12 
and 204-a.l of the Taylor Law. The hearing officer notes that 
the parties used the terms"ratification" and 'approval"imprecisely 
and interchangeably. The second document was labeled a "Memo-
randum of Understanding", and concerned the retirement incentive 
plan for the term January 1, 1980 through June 30, 1982. At the 
\J'0 t. KJ 
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required. whether such approval is required, the conduct of the 
local legislature in voting such approval was, according to the 
hearing officer, beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. 
The District filed exceptions to the hearing officer's deci-
sion alleging, in substance, that the decision was not supported 
by substantial evidence and the hearing officer had committed 
error in his conclusions of law. The Association filed cross-
exceptions in which it requested that the District be ordered to 
implement the Memorandum of Understanding. We deem that request 
to be an exception to the hearing officer's remedy recommendation. 
DISCUSSION. 
The hearing officer decided that the school board members of 
the negotiating team were obligated to recommend approval and to 
vote in favor or the Memorandum of Understanding, and their fail-
1 • 
ure to do so constitutes an improper practice. We do not agree 
with the hearing officer that every member of a negotiating team 
is obligated to support every part of an agreement. In this con-
1 Relying upon UnionSprings^ Central School District Teachers Asso-
ciation, 6 PERB 1f3074 (1973), the hearing officer wrote! 
"However, even assuming that it was told directly that 
[the school board members of the negotiating team] would 
vote against the plan - which it was not - that does not 
excuse their actions, which were clearly in dereliction of 
their responsibilities under the Act. As voluntary members 
of the District's negotiating team, they were bound to 
speak and act only in support of the agreement signed by 
the chief negotiator regardless of their personal feelings 
and whether or not they personally participated in any 
negotiations on this subject." 
oooO 
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4. 
lative action, we do not sustain the finding of a violation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 29, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
4 We do not reach the question here whether legislative action 
that is ultra vires the authority of the local legislative 
body might constitute an improper practice. C'£". Jefferson 
County Board of Supervisors, 6 PERB 1[3031 (1973), rev. on 
other grounds 44 AD2d 893 (1974)/ af fd.' 36 'NX2d. 534; (1975). 
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